Today in Parliament, Abigail moved a motion highlighting the stark reality of the AUKUS pact - that an East Coast nuclear submarine base with enriched uranium on it would make NSW a potential military target and called on both major parties to rule out any submarine base in NSW before the next election.

Abigail said:

I move:

(1) That this House notes that:

• • Government documents released under a call for papers have revealed New South Wales Government plans and preferences for the location of an East Coast Nuclear Submarine Base, including a cost-benefit analysis conducted comparing Port Kembla and Port of Newcastle as a preferred location;
  • planning Minister and member for Wollongong, Paul Scully, has repeatedly said "no work" on where to locate the base had been done under the Minns Labor Government;
  • however, the cost-benefit analysis contained in the previously secret documents was completed in September 2023, six months after the New South Wales Labor Government was elected, and cited Australian Bureau of Statistics data released in June 2023, also after Labor's election; and
  • when asked whether the New South Wales Labor Government would rule out any support for Port Kembla or Port of Newcastle being selected as a site for a nuclear submarine base, Premier Chris Minns said, "Look, I won't rule it out, but I think that in an economy that we want to see growing, if people have got an initiative or a proposal that needs to be ventilated and spoken about, but there's a lot of money."

(2) That this House further notes that these documents produced by the New South Wales Government:

• • reveal that "the East Coast Base [ECNB] will harbour submarines that have nuclear reactors fuelled by highly enriched uranium on board. In the event of a military conflict the ECNB could be a target for Australian military adversaries. For these reasons New South Wales residents may perceive the ECNB similarly to a nuclear power station as a source of environmental disaster risk. The damage expected to arise from a nuclear accident has an explicit spatial dimension, and residents in proximity will perceive the ECNB as a risk to their community's health and the local environment";
  • calculate the expected impact on house prices in the proximity of the nuclear base, based on the negative price impacts on houses in close proximity to nuclear power plants in other jurisdictions. However, the documents make clear that the negative impact may be greater in relation to a nuclear military base, stating "nuclear submarines may be far riskier because they use a highly enriched uranium that is more like the uranium used in nuclear warheads than uranium used in nuclear reactors and they store enough uranium to operate the nuclear submarine for over 30 years"; and
  • cited United Kingdom housing data post Fukushima, which showed a drop in home values within a 15-kilometre radius of a nuclear facility. When the analysis was applied to Newcastle, it found that 129,000 homes would suffer losses at a central estimate at $1.048 billion, and 105,000 households in Port Kembla would incur house price value losses of $850 million.

(3) That this House further notes that the documents state:

• • "while the Australian Government have made it clear that all feasible options will be considered as part of the process, New South Wales, including government, industry and the community, is on notice that Port of Newcastle and Port Kembla are two of the options that will be considered. The postponement of a decision on location, timing and scope of an ECNB will create a period of prolonged uncertainty, changing the risk profile of a potential ECNB as it relates to state government interests and responsibilities… A prolonged period of uncertainty for the NSW Government, industry and the community regarding the location, scope and timing of an ECNB presents risks specific to that period of uncertainty in addition to those risks already identified in the risk register, including: Added complexity in six cities planning, given the prevalence of the role of the trading ports to that planning; Added complexity for the anticipated review of ports policy, given the direct relationship between an ECNB and a container terminal at either Port of Newcastle or Port Kembla; Uncertainty in the prioritisation of government investment in capital infrastructure, particularly the timing of transport infrastructure, as well as in the timing and scale of growth required in social infrastructure including housing, health, education and recreation; Market distortion in investment at and near Port Kembla and Port of Newcastle, potentially inhibiting as well as accelerating alternative developments; Increased economic, social and environmental costs of development of delivery of an ECNB and supporting social infrastructure should a base proceed in NSW";
  • "the decision of the ECNB locating at either Port Kembla or Port of Newcastle, will determine the location of a second container port in New South Wales at either Port of Newcastle (if ECNB proceeds in Port Kembla) or Port Kembla (if ECNB proceeds in Port of Newcastle). It will also determine what infrastructure projects must be incurred by the NSW Government to accommodate container freight movements to the second container port. Major impacts relate to the redistribution of container freight on New South Wales road and rail networks. The decision of the ECNB locating at either Port of Newcastle or Port Kembla, will also influence the timing of the development of a second container terminal"; and
  • "a new freight and ports plan is being developed in parallel with the Six Cities Region Plan, to ensure the vision and policies are aligned and represented cohesively and consistently across NSW Government plans".

(4) That this House notes that, while the New South Wales Government claims it is not working to assist the development of an East Coast Nuclear Base, there has been a number of significant changes to New South Wales planning documents that would seek to create space for the progression of an East Coast Nuclear Base at either Port Kembla or Newcastle, including:

• • updating the NSW Freight Policy in a document called "Delivering freight policy reform in New South Wales" prepared for the Hon. John Graham, Minister for Transport, NSW, in June 2025. Under the previous plan, Port Kembla was identified as the location for a second container port when required, but the NSW Labor plan will no longer prefer Port Kembla for an expanded container port; and
  • abolishing the Six Cities plan, which had been identified as incompatible with the ECNB without significant amendment.

(5) That this House calls on the New South Wales Labor Government to make a formal public declaration that it does not support an East Coast Nuclear Base being located at either Port Kembla or Newcastle and will not allocate capital from the New South Wales State budget towards infrastructure designed to facilitate an East Coast Nuclear Base.

A little while ago—at the end of last year—the House resolved on motion to ask the Government for documents on where a potential AUKUS nuclear submarine base might be if it were to be located in New South Wales. That was on the back of a lot of interest after it was announced by the Federal Government a few years prior—at the time, a Coalition Federal Government—that we would need to have, in its view, as part of the AUKUS agreement, a nuclear submarine base located at either Port Kembla, the Port of Newcastle or in Brisbane. A process commenced in which the Federal Government did scoping work with the States to see where it might make sense and would be feasible for the submarine base to be located.

As part of that, the previous New South Wales Coalition Government commenced work to look at what would be involved for a nuclear submarine base located at either the Port of Newcastle or Port Kembla. Importantly, that work continued when the New South Wales Labor Government came into power. The returned documents clearly show work was being done while Labor was in government both in New South Wales and Federally. The work was commenced under previous governments but both Labor governments were definitely working until the end of 2023 on where it would be a good idea to put a nuclear submarine base. Members can see that from the documents, and I encourage them to have a look at those.

When the documents were released, people in the Illawarra and in Newcastle were quite interested, for obvious reasons. Fundamentally, the documents reveal that Port Kembla is the preferred site for the New South Wales Government based on a cost‑benefit analysis, and also that Newcastle still remains as an open option. The documents contain an explicit acknowledgement that an east coast base would not be accepted by the community "because residents are likely to perceive the base as a source of risk due to there being nuclear reactors on board the submarines and the military base being a potential military target". The documents also noted the negative impact the base will have on the community, saying:

The relocation of NSW residents represents a net cost, which may be borne by the resident or by NSW Government through financial compensation. Displaced NSW residents may also result in frictional unemployment, which will involve lost wages and may also involve additional re-training costs.

In short, it was seen that, wherever the nuclear submarine base was to be located, it would be deeply unpopular with the people of Illawarra and of Newcastle. The documents also reveal a choice: If one of the ports were to be used for a submarine base, the other port would be required to pick up the excess container freight capacity. Either way it is sliced, if a nuclear submarine base is put into one of those locations, a lot of work will be needed to beef up the container capacity of the other one—particularly by 2041, as that timeframe is seen as necessary based on the current forecasts, because one port would be exclusively given over as a nuclear submarine base.

The documents also reveal clearly that having a nuclear submarine base in one spot would preclude a bunch of other industries—include having facilities like a hydrogen hub and others—from being in the nearby area. That is for security reasons but also because of the disastrous impacts if the reactor onboard one of the submarines were to go horribly wrong. Importantly, a decision would have been made by this Government when it came in to work out whether it would take this proposal seriously. I will come back to that in my speech in reply. I encourage members to support the motion and also to read the documents for themselves.

Both Labor and the Opposition opposed the motion, to which Abigail responded:

The Government has to either rule the nuclear base out or accept that it is planning around it. A freight strategy released in July last year had changed its tune regarding Port Kembla. If the Government is not planning around it, that is quite negligent. The Greens political movement is glad to have brought the documents to the attention of the communities that will be impacted so catastrophically. It is unclear how repeating what is contained in released documents can be seen as fearmongering. It is a clear option to the Government to rule the base out. The Minister said that no work had been done, which is patently untrue if we look at the dates of the documents released. The Labor Government was working on it until at least the end of 2023. That is what the documents say. Again, this is not fearmongering but facts. When asked about it, the Premier said that he would not rule it out because it could be good money. That was quite a strange statement. Members can see it in the motion. It is unclear why the Labor Government is now claiming that it does not think this is something that could ever go ahead and is refusing to rule it out. It is calling it fearmongering when it is on record saying, if it is good money, it might consider it.

We have been told that a decision needs to be made by 2030. Again, are we planning for this or are we not? The Government either has its head in the sand and is pretending that it is not happening—then it will scramble to work around it, and it will cost us a lot more money in the long run—or it knows full well where it is going, and it is planning actively around it as we speak. It has to be one or the other. At the end of the day, seven million people between the Illawarra and Newcastle should have a say in this. It is about that secrecy. No‑one had a say when we signed up to AUKUS, but some of us are not so arrogant that we think a few politicians should be making that kind of decision by themselves.

This is the real-world impact of the AUKUS pact. A nuclear submarine base with enriched uranium on it would make us a target, without us even being consulted. If that is the impact of a decision by the previous Federal Coalition Government, which is endorsed by the Labor Government, then Labor does not get to claim that it has no responsibility for it and that it is not working on it. It strikes me as incredibly negligent if there is no current planning going on around this. If there is planning, not involving the community that it will impact is quite horrific. I call on both major parties to rule out any submarine base in New South Wales before the next election.

Read the debate in Hansard here.

27 May 2026